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Filling the Court-Created Gap in the
Protection of Concerted Activities
The Need for Striker Replacement Legislation in the Promotion of
Constructive Collective Bargaining
HAROLD A. KATZ*

Since the eighties, it has been insane to go on strike.
Every strike ends in disaster. The members go out, roaring
mad, like in the old days. Then they watch the "crossovers"
add up, day by day, watch until they reach the magic number,
tip the balance, and the company can start up, nonunion, and
bust the strike.
Our guys stand there, disbelieving, with picket signs on
their shoulders, like batters looking at called third strikes.
They stand there with their little buttons that say, in capital
letters, "SCAB HUNTER," under the barrel of a gun. But
the buttons do not scare anyone. People breeze right over the
line. In America, people scab on everyone: Americans even
scabbed on the pros, their darlings, in the pro-football strike.
THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON 4-5 (1991).'
* B.A., Vanderbilt University; M.A. and J.D., University of Chicago. This
paper is an extension of the remarks of Mr. Katz at the Northern Illinois College. of
Law symposium on "Labor Law in the Nineties" on November 20, 1992. Mr. Katz
is currently a partner in the law firm of Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago,
which is counsel for a number of unions, including the UAW.
1. A succinct academic summary of the problem posed by Mr. Geoghegan, a
union-side labor lawyer, is found in the following statement of Professor Gillespie:
Three decades of stare decisis have invested the Mackay doctrine with the
dignity of hornbook truth, but subsequent developments in labor law have
left Mackay a stranded anomaly. From the first, the "permanent replacement" doctrine clashed with standard interpretations of the National Labor
Relations Act. The economic strike is intended to impose economic hardship
on the employer and strengthen the union's negotiating position by stopping
production. The Mackay doctrine, however, undercuts the purpose of the
strike by allowing the employer to continue production with the help- of
permanent replacements. In addition, permanent replacement of workers
executes industrial relation's "capital punishment" - termination of the
striker's employment contract. After severance of the working arrangement
between employer and employee, the statutory right to engage in concerted
activities is of little value.
Hal K. Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEx.
L. REv. 782, 783 (1972).
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Rarely has a court decision been so flawed in its initiation and
its articulation as the one rendered more than a half century ago by

the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co.3
It is one of the great ironies of our time that the Mackay doctrine
emanated from a case in the Supreme Court won by the Board for

the union! The historically significant part of the decision was not
even on a point on which the Supreme Court had taken the case in
the first place. The so-called right to hire permanent strike replacements was not an issue in the case. It was a point never really briefed
or argued by the parties. It was not relevant to the facts in the case
- pure dictum, as lawyers say. The Court in its opinion never sought

to justify the rule in terms of the language of the statute or its overall
policies. Yet, that dictum was to dictate the fundamentals of collective

bargaining in the United States for the decades that were to follow.
It was to shape the battle that will surely take place in the Congress

in the period ahead. It would be the major issue that would vitally

affect collective bargaining in the United States in the eighties and in
the nineties.
I.

THE MACKAY DECISION

Mackay was a simple and obvious case without complexity under
the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"). That it would even reach
the Supreme Court for determination was attributable only to its
timing. It arose right after the passage of the Act when nothing had
yet been determined in litigation.4 The statute clearly banned discrim2. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
3. The "Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act," which would reverse the
Mackay doctrine, passed the U.S. House of Representatives on June 15, 1993 by a
vote of 239 to 190. Clifford Krauss, "House Passes Bill to Ban Replacement of
Strikers, NY TIMES June 15, 1993 at A9. "But the real battle will be fought next
month in the Senate, where Republicans have far more power than in the House
because of their ability to filibuster." Id. A year earlier, virtually the same bill passed
the House by a vote of 247 to 182; its proponents fell three votes short of invoking
cloture in an attempt to break a Republican filibuster. Adam Clymer, Two Panels
Back Labor Position in Strike Hiring, NY TIMES May 6, 1993, at A8. Initially, the
bill was called "the Striker Replacement Bill," then it was renamed the "Workplace
Fairness Bill," before adding to the title the name of the recently-deceased agricultural
farm labor leader, Cesar Chavez, on May 5, 1993. Id.
4. Hearings on H.R. 3936 Before the Subcommittee on Labor Management
Relations of the House Committee on Labor and Education, Cong., Ist Sess. ( )
(statement of Professor Daniel H. Pollett). The NLRA was signed into law on July
5, 1935. The complaint against Mackay was issued on November 9, 1935. The Board
issued its order on February 20, 1936 and an enforcement action was instituted in
the Ninth Circuit by the Board in March, 1936. Id.
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ination against employees for engaging in protected concerted activities, of which the strike was the most obvious form.
In Mackay an agreement had been reached between the employer
and the union following a strike, but the company refused to take
back "five strikers who were prominent in the activities of the
union." 5 The employer's refusal to do so was the only unfair labor
practice litigated. Nothing in the Board's complaint touched upon the
question of the employer's right to hire permanent replacements for
economic strikers, nor was this issue litigated. The discrimination
against the strike leaders was a flagrant, direct violation of Section
8(a)(3) and affirmance of the Board's order of reinstatement was
routine. However, the opinion of the Court went further, adding:
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking
employes [sic] with others in an effort to carry on the business.
Although § 13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike," it does not follow that an employer,
guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right
to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those
hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the
latter to resume their employment, in order to create places
for them. The assurance by respondent to those who accepted
employment during the strike that if they so desired their
places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice
nor was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as
there were vacant places to be filled.'

5. Id. at 339.

6. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). This language was irrelevant to the facts in
Mackay where the five strike leaders were clearly unfair labor practice strikers who
were entitled to reinstatement. What has become known as the "Mackay doctrine,"
which arises from the language just quoted above, is applicable only to economic
strikes. "By contrast, strike activity that is caused or prolonged by an employer's
unfair labor practice is known as an unfair labor practice strike. Unfair labor practice
strikers have the right to request and secure reinstatement, and may not be permanently replaced." H.R. REp. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 11 n.1 (1991).
Making a striker's reinstatement dependent upon the ultimate determination by
the Board and the courts that the employee was in fact an unfair labor practice
striker means that no matter how grievous was the employer's provocative conduct,
still as a practical matter the employee can never know upfront whether he will
ultimately be found to have any entitlement to his job.
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Many legal scholars have condemned Mackay,7 yet it instantly
became hornbook law. It has not thereafter been questioned by the
NLRB nor by the courts. This new employer "right," nowhere
enunciated in the Act nor elsewhere except by this dictum of the
Court, is now fully enshrined. The Board has found a company's
right to replace economic strikers to be unlimited, not being confined
even by what objectively are that employer's legitimate economic
needs. The Board has said:
[Ain employer may replace economic strikers [regardless of
whether] it is shown that he acted to preserve efficient operation of his business. The Supreme Court's decision in [Mackay]
and the cases thereafter ... state that an employer has a legal
right to replace economic strikers at will. We construe these
cases as holding that the motive for such replacements is
immaterial, absent evidence of an independent unlawful purpose.

8

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has not directly retreated from
the harsh realities of Mackay, declining to consider its effect on the
protected Section 7 right to strike. Recently, it said:
[T]he employer's right to hire permanent replacements in order
to continue operations will inevitably . . . have the effect of
7. James B. Atleson, The Right to Strike: False Promises and Underlying

Premises, in COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE NLRA 19, 21 ("drastically undercut the
new act's protection of the critical right to strike" - "Mackay's shadow falls across
all of labor-management relations"); Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35
Nw. U. L. REv. 817, 830-32 (1941) ("Sounder considerations of public policy ...
suggest a view contrary to [Mackay]"; Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the NLRA, 115 PA. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1967) ("questionable that it is valid in enough cases to justify [the Mackay] rule"); Gillespie,
supra note 1, at 783 ("a stranded anomaly" - "the Court did violence to the liberal
policies of the statute"); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
& the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-02 (1978)
(a "paradigmatic representation of the vices of conceptualist legal reasoning");

George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer 'Protected' Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 385 (1969) (Mackay "doctrine's
apparent inconsistency with the dictates of Sections 7, 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)" leads to
"a multitude of difficult problems and anomalies"); Paul Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 351, 393 (1984) ("few rules of American labor law have been as heavily
criticized as [Mackay]"); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE
L.J. 630, 632 (1966) ("[T]he permanent replacement rule should now be reconsidered.").
8. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1964).
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dividing striking employees between those who, fearful of
permanently losing their jobs, return to work and those who
remain stalwart in the strike....
That the prospect of a reduction in available positions
may divide employees and create incentives among them to
remain at work or abandon a strike before- its conclusion is
. . fairly within the arsenal of economic weapons available
to employers during a [strike]. 9
*

A counsel for the AFL-CIO has bluntly stated what Mackay
represents to the American labor movement:
Mackay serves not only as a vivid illustration to workers of
our legal system's willingness cynically to promise workers
rights while, in practice, rendering those "rights" illusory, but
also as a fundamental impediment to the development of stable
and productive collective bargaining relationships in our society. Mackay thus stands as an unfortunate reminder that our
legal system's endorsement of collective bargaining is a very
equivocal one and that ultimately workers must trust not in
the promises of our legal system, but in their own solidarity
to attain a more just workplace. 0
II.

EMPLOYER CONDUCT

An employer who extended the logic of the Court in Mackay by
providing super-seniority as an extra incentive to induce strike replacements to come to work during the dispute was held by the Board and
the Court to have violated the Act. The Court held that the employer
went too far in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp." in offering twenty
years' additional seniority to replacements and to strikers who returned to work.' 2 The difference the Court saw in Erie Resistor was
"the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct
9. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S.
426, 437-38 (1989).
10. Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacement: a Labor Union Perspective, 43
PROC. N.Y.U CONF. ON LABOR 23, 26 (1990).
11. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
12. Id. The employer limited its bountiful seniority offer only to the use of
seniority for credit against future layoffs. The Company was quite willing that the
extra seniority be utilized to guarantee that employee a job as against one of its
regular employees, but wanted it clear that the strike replacement was not entitled to
use it toward improved vacation benefits at the employer's expense! Id. at 223.
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itself."' 3 "The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very
and inescapably flow from his acconsequences which foreseeably
4
said.'
tions," the Court
While "the employer may counter by claiming that his actions
were taken in the pursuit of legitimate business ends and that his
dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to invade union rights,"
the Court in Erie Resistor reasoned, nevertheless "his conduct does
speak for itself - it is discriminatory and it does discourage union

membership .... 15

In Great Dane Trailers v. NLRB,16 the employer offered vacation
benefits to workers who crossed the picket line but not to strikers
during an economic strike. The Court, in overturning a Circuit Court
ruling that had hypothesized sufficient business justification in the
absence of any company showing of such, held that the employer's
discriminatory conduct in granting vacation benefits only to crossovers
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights and that
anti-union motivation need not be demonstrated in order to make out
a discrimination violation. 17 If an employer's actions infringe upon
an employee's Section 7 rights "to some extent," the burden of proof
is on the employer to come forward with a legitimate business
justification for its discriminatory action 8 - an obligation the Court
has been unwilling to put on the employer in the typical Mackay
strike replacement situation.
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer,19 the Court held that an employer's hiring of new employees while there were outstanding applications
for reinstatement from permanently replaced workers constituted an
unfair labor practice absent a showing by the employer of a substantial
and legitimate business necessity for its actions. The Board's decision
in Laidlaw grants permanently replaced workers preferential hiring
rights for job vacancies that arise after their application for reinstatement. 20

13. Id.at 228.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
17. Id. at 332-34.
18. Id. at 333-34.
19. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
20. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175 (1968), enforced, Laidlaw Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). The worth of these rights in the contemporary
scene has been questioned. Note the comment of Leonard Page:
In an era of declining employment, the right to be on a preferential hiring
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It is ironic that the Court prohibits an employer from offering
superseniority to strike breakers, or special post-strike vacations to
crossovers, at the same time that it permits that employer to give the
jobs of its employees to anyone willing to cross the picket line. It is
as though the law permits killing but not wounding, as one treatise
2
comments. '
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STRIKER PROTECTIONS

The "right" of an employer to permanently replace strikers was
derived by the Court from a statute that contained several references
to strikes. Legislators' concern for the protection of strikers is pervasive throughout the statute.
Section 7 of the Act, described by the chief sponsor of the bill,
Senator Robert Wagner (D.-N.Y.), as an "omnibus guaranty of
freedom" for American workers states:
Employees shall have the right ... to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
' 22
other mutual aid or protection.
Furthermore, a publication issued by the Board, in discussing Section
7, says:
Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected
23
for employees by this section.
These rights are protected and reinforced by Section 8 of the
Act. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7, while section 8(a)(3) specifically
prohibits employers, "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization."2'
list ahead of new hires is about as valuable a right to the worker as being
on former President Reagan's Christmas card list.
Leonard R. Page, Strikes and Other Forms of Economic Warfare - A Union
Perspective, 8 CONF. ON LABOR & EMPLOY. L. (Center for Dispute Resolution, Stetson
University College of Law, Tampa, Florida), Jan. 23, 1993, at 7.
21. J.G. GETMAN & B. PROGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES,
LAW AND PRACTICE 141 (1988).
22. I LEGIS.LATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935

1419 (1949) (statement of Senator Wagner).
23. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, A GUIDE TO BASIC

DURES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 4 (1987).

24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) (1988).

LAW AND PROCE-
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The right of employees to strike is further protected by Sections
2(3) and 13 of the Act. Section 2(3) provides that employees do not
lose their status as employees when their "work has ceased as 2a
consequences of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute.
Section 13 declares that "[n]othing in [the NLRA] shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike .... -26
From even a casual perusal of these provisions, it is readily
apparent that Congress endowed the right to strike with special
protection under the Act. The Court, without demonstrating any
statutory or logical bases, managed to sacrifice that right in an
unfortunate dictum. It is long overdue for Congress to restore to the
statute a meaningful protected quality of the right to strike.

IV.

THE ANOMALY OF PERMANENT REPLACEMENT

The "off-hand" statement in Mackay "created a very troubling
anomaly in federal labor relations law: employees cannot be disciplined or discharged for engaging in a strike, but they can be
permanently replaced." ' 27 Congressman Brennan of Maine, the leadoff witness in the Congressional Hearings on the striker replacement
legislation that would reverse the Mackay doctrine, commented that
he had not "been able to figure out the difference between permanent
replacement and being fired - as soon as they go on strike ....
The Congressman is not alone in failing to discern any meaningful
difference between an employee being permanently replaced and being
fired. Professor Paul Weiler of the Harvard Law School had these
comments about the distinction:
For the last several decades, labor law classes around the
country have annually broken out in laughter at the thought
that lawyers and judges would draw such a spurious distinction
between discharging and permanently replacing an employee
in his job.[29 ] But to ordinary workers, this legal distinction is
25. 29 U.S.C. § 192(3) (1988).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
27. H.R. REP. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,

at 3.
28. Id.

PT.

3, at 2 (1991).

29. Professor William B. Gould of the Stanford Law School has had the same
experience in his labor law classes. He said:
Every year when I teach my students about the rules relating to the
strike weapon in Labor Law I, I always explain the practical significance of
engaging in protected activity. I point out to them that the practical
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no joke at all. The employee may have spent twenty to thirty

years with a firm, investing his whole working life building up
a stake of experience and security in this enterprise that cannot
possibly be duplicated somewhere else. Then, if the employee

chooses to go out on strike, pursuing the course our labor law
says is the only way open to try to improve (or even maintain)

terms and conditions of employment, the firm's management

is free to hire replacements who with less than twenty to thirty
minutes on the job get a permanent claim to the position as

against the striker.3 0

Professor Schatzki has observed that the distinction between
permanent replacement and discharge "can hardly mean anything to
the displaced employee." However, to the employer, as a practical

matter, "in almost all cases, the Mackay doctrine - despite its
articulated distinction - is an invitation to the employer, if he is
able, to rid himself of union adherents and the union."'"
A so-called "protected right to strike" that does not entitle the
striker to resume his job after the labor dispute has been settled is to
the worker incomprehensible and meaningless. It is a "right" that is
about as useful as the insurance policy that Groucho Marx was selling

in one of his movies under the terms of which if the policyholder lost
a leg, the insurance company would help him look for it!
Professors Getman and Goldberg studied over thirty-five private

sector organizing campaigns. They confirmed what employer and
union leaders have long known - that Mackay means, in practice,
that employees who exercise their Section 7 rights can lose their jobs.
significance is thaL the employee is immunized from employer self-help
instituted against [workers] in the form of discipline or discharge for
engaging in the conduct [in] question. But then I tell them that despite the
fact that workers cannot be discharged or disciplined for engaging in a
strike, they can be permanently replaced. Either this produces nervous
laughter or expressions of puzzlement - and well it should!
Id. at 12 (quoting W.B. Gould, The Permanent Replacement of Strikers, Remarks
at the U.S. Dept. of Labor Symposium on Vital Issues and New Directions in Labor
Management Relations (March 17, 1988).
30. H.R. REp. No. 57, supra note 27, at 13. The rights of strike replacements
are not confined to those who may have "twenty to thirty minutes on the job." The
Board has accorded Mackay rights to an employee who had never worked on the job
and in fact, at the point the strike ended, had never even taken certain tests that
were a prerequisite to being employed on the job. Solar Turbines, Inc., 302 NLRB
No. 3 (1991).
31. Schatzki, supra note 7, at 383.
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The chilling effect of this on an employee's willingness to support a
union in an NLRB election campaign was demonstrated over and over
again by the study. Professor Getman summarized the result in this
way:
In virtually every campaign, the employer announced it would
bargain tough so that employees would have to strike to gain
substantial benefits. The employees were also told that, in the
event of a strike, they would be vulnerable to permanent
replacement, an option that the employer would not hesitate
to exercise. Such campaigning can be done within the law.
The obvious intent (confirmed in interviews with company
officials) was to convey the message that if employees chose
to unionize they would thereby endanger their jobs. The
prevalence of this message in legal employee campaigns may
well explain why we found that the employee perception that
the employer had threatened reprisal was as great in legal as
it was in unlawful campaigns.... When the process is infused
with fear based on the threat of job loss, to speak of the
organizing process as an exercise of free choice is to engage
32
in double speak.
The national labor policy favors collective bargaining as the
3
preferred method for the settlement of industrial disputes. The
assumption of the statutory system is that labor and management will
sit down at the bargaining table, and each will, in good faith seek to
reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the issues in dispute. The
theory has been that the parties are each anxious to resolve the dispute
- the employer because of its interest in uninterrupted production,
the employees because of the consequences they suffer from the strike
in terms of income loss. The system worked surprisingly well for
many years, even though on the periphery there were a limited number
of situations, usually involving fringe industries, in which the employers manifested an interest not to reach agreement with the union but
to destroy it. Due to a change in the psychology of management and
the national and international economy, all of this has changed.
The incidence of major strikes has been in a steady decline in the
United States for the past two decades; a 1990 study by the General
Accounting Office indicated that the threat to hire permanent replace32. Hearings on S. 2112 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1990) (Statement of
Professor Julius G. Getman) (hereinafter Hearings on S. 2112).
33. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1988).

1993:247]

A CALL FOR STRIKER REPLACEMENT LEGISLATION

257

ments occurred in about thirty percent of strikes in 1989.34 Wellpaying jobs with fringe benefits have been increasingly in short supply,
and a large pool of job-hungry applicants are available to be enticed
through the picket lines like scavengers to a jungle kill.
From a national point of view, the real vice of the Mackay
doctrine is that in a country dedicated to the policy of the settlement
of industrial disputes by collective bargaining, it throws into contention an additional issue between the parties that makes the dispute,
for all practical purposes, impossible to resolve. The employer, having
encouraged strike replacements to come through the picket line, feels
bound for various reasons to protect them; at the same time there is
no way the union's members will ever agree that their jobs can go to
crossovers. Thus, no matter how skilled the negotiators, how able the
conciliator, the issues at the table are no longer solvable. What had
been a difficult dispute now becomes virtually a hopeless one. A new
element has now been introduced that poisoned the well.
Each negotiation can become not just a dispute over the terms
of a new agreement, but one in which the employer is encouraged to
negotiate in such a way as to force a strike so that he can eliminate
union supporters or even the union itself. 3" This is the anomaly of
Mackay, even though it purports to interpret a statute designed to
promote collective bargaining and the settlement of labor disputes in
the United States.
Once the employer has gone the route of recruiting and hiring
permanent replacements, it becomes very difficult to turn back. If he
sticks with the crossovers while continuing to deal with the union, the
move spells much trouble for all concerned. The employer has an
incentive to convert what may have been an emergency course to keep
his business in operation into a campaign to rid himself of the union
entirely. Thus in today's job market collective bargaining is replaced
by posturing and baiting, and the statutory policy favoring constructive collective bargaining is increasingly subverted.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF RENEWED LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS

If Mackay is corrected by legislation, we need not fear that we
will be at a competitive disadvantage internationally. "It is noteworthy
34. Page, supra note 20, at 7.
35. Cf. David Moberg, Labor's Bad Boys, Cm. TRIB., March 19, 1993, § 5, at
I ("It may seem odd that an employer, not labor union members, would want a
strike. Yet, during the past decade many companies have seen a strike as their
opportunity to permanently replace longtime workers with non-union strikebreakers.").
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that in countries such as Japan, Germany, France, and Sweden, in
which labor management cooperation has become the dominant approach, employers may neither dismiss nor permanently replace striking workers." '3 6 "It can be seen even more clearly from the example
of Canada, which has similar labor laws and a structured economy
similar to our own, but where the hiring of permanent replacements
during a strike is illegal and employers may operate only with temporary replacements." 3 7 Employers would remain free to resist the
demands of the union with resort to the same panoply of weapons
they have, for all practical purposes, been using for years - the
hiring of temporary replacements, utilizing supervisors and other nonunit or retired workers or crossovers to do production work, subcontracting, lockouts or shutdowns. The House Committee on Education
and Labor, in favorably reporting out House Resolution 5, the
proposed federal striker replacement legislation "to prevent discrimination based on participation in labor disputes, ' 3 said:
Given these alternative economic options, the contention that
permanent replacements are necessary to stay in business is
unfounded. Indeed, employers win many strikes today (and
have for decades) in which no permanent replacements are
hired or threatened. Just as the absence of permanent replacements does not assure union success in a strike, the enactment
of H.R. 5 would likewise not assure either side success. Rather
it would help ensure that a stable and productive relationship
between employers and employee survives at the conclusion of
39
a strike.
From all of this Professor Weiler of Harvard concludes that the
promise of permanent job replacements for crossovers, as is afforded
by Mackay, "is simply not needed to recruit people who are out of
work and without a regular paycheck."' 4 To this Weiler adds:
Even if this added inducement might be useful in a handful
of situations, the benefit gained is hardly "substantial" enough
4
to justify the doctrine's stark impact on the right to strike. '
36. Hearings on S. 2112, supra note 32, at 9.
37. Kamiat, supra note 10, at 49.
38. H.R. Rep. No. 57, supra note 27, at 1.
39. Id. at 28.
40. Weiler, supra note 7, at 392 n.128.
41. Weiler, supra note 7, at 392 n.128. That unions may have "needed"
secondary boycotts to prevail in some labor disputes with employers did not deter
Congress from curtailing their use.
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Unions have felt that they have taken a great deal of punishment
over the past in terms of America's failing international image, the
difficulties we have had competing in the world market. It started out
that everybody blamed the American worker, the abused, inefficient
American worker. Now take a look at the productivity of the American worker as seen from England recently by one of the world's most
respected and distinguished economics journals:
Americans fret about falling behind the other big economies.
But contrary to popular perception, the average American
worker is still far more productive than his foreign counterpart .... For the business sector as a whole, French and
German productivity is about 15% below America's, Britain's
is 27% lower, and Japan's is a staggering 42% lower. Even in
manufacturing, Japanese productivity is 20% less than America's.
Research by Edward Mace, an economist at New York
University, confirms that America tops the productivity league
42
in most manufacturing industries.
Moreover, the productivity gain of American workers is accelerating. The U.S. Department of Labor recently reported that American
workers posted their biggest productivity gain in two decades in 1992.41
No wonder that the scholars, the writers and the thinkers are
now attributing the great difficulty America has had competing in the
world to the inadequacy of the management of American companies,
corporate management. Over and over again the critics are pointing
to the fact that American management, compared to Japanese management, is paid many times over what Japanese management is paid.
As the Wall Street Journal had occasion to comment, in terms of
level of compensation of chief executives, "Americans are a breed
apart.'"4 The Journal cites a survey by a New York firm that are
international consultants on compensation. The survey showed "that
42. America the Super-Fit, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1993 at 67. A practical
confirmation of the article about relative worker efficiency in manufacturing is found
in an announcement of the German automaker, Mercedes Benz, that it will build its
next plant in the United States. The corporation, in announcing its decision, cited
superior American productivity - American workers can put together a vehicle in
about twenty-five hours, compared with thirty hours for German workers. Illinois
Woos Mercedes Benz, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1993, § 2, at 1.
43. Biggest Rise Since '72 for Productivity, CHIC. TRIB., March 10, 1993, sec.
3, at 3.
44. Amanda Bennett, Manager's Incomes Aren't Worlds Apart, WALL STREET
J., October 12, 1992, at Bl.
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it's primarily U.S. Chief executive pay that's out of whack." ' And
Japanese management has proven so much abler in terms of production and quality and all the other things that go into successful
management.

VI.

CONSTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR THE

90s

Restoration of a protected right to the job after the strike is
settled is essential to the preservation and the flowering of the
collective bargaining system in the United States. The former chairman
of the FDIC made a study recently of companies that had maintained
their competitive edge in the world. He found that virtually all of
them had implemented substantial labor management ways of empowering workers, giving them an increasing sense of power and participation .6
A commendable example of what the 90's may hold in store is
found in General Motors and the United Automobile Workers
("UAW"). When General Motors decided to go into the Saturn
program, it resolved in the very beginning to work intimately and
closely with the UAW. The company set up a committee that included
UAW representatives. GM decided that every aspect of the Saturn
would be approved jointly by the committee, including plant location,
plant construction, machinery in the plant, the processes of production, and it even included, believe it or not, pricing and marketing of
the Saturn.
In other words, General Motors invited the UAW to participate
in every aspect of creating the Saturn. It will come as no surprise to
those of you who read the newspapers that one of the few glowing
successes in the domestic auto industry - and GM's brightest achievement today - is the Saturn program. It is a program in which workers
participated wholeheartedly, gave their hearts and souls, and the best
of their experience, minds and abilities to market a car that would be
imports, and that would be the
successful in competing with foreign
47
best car that GM could make.

45. Id.
46. Barry Bluestone & Irving Bluestone, Workers (and Managers)of the World
Unite, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Nov./Dec., 1992, at 34. The Bluestones' central thesis

of labor-management creative cooperation is expanded in their new book, NEGOTI-

ATING THE FUTURE. A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992).

47. An attempt by dissidents to defeat Mike Bennett, the president of the UAW
Saturn local at Spring Hill, Tennessee, in his local union reelection bid on April 2,
1993 was soundly rejected by the membership of the Local. Bennett led the successful

1993:247]

A CALL FOR STRIKER REPLACEMENT LEGISLATION

261

Contrast this with the rancor and bitterness in the labor-management relationship that is the inevitable result of the hiring of permanent strike replacements. 48 The direct and the subtle costs to

management are enormous. In terms of quality production, there is

no substitute for a workforce with high standards and a desire to do
everything it can to produce a perfect product. "You can buy a dog,
but you can't buy the wag of its tail," an old saying goes. An
employer whose work force simply performs the work as assigned by
the supervisor is missing out on the extraordinary efforts that motivated workers can produce to enhance product quality and quantity.
"By 'working to rule,' workers denied employers the ingenuity,
effort and knowledge that their bosses, often quite unknowingly, took
for granted," observed a writer for the Chicago Tribune recently. 49
"Productivity and quality improve because workers are constantly
involved in trying to prevent defects." 0 "The Mackay doctrine works
at cross purposes to establishing the stable and enduring laborslate in the vote. Boost for Saturn Pact: Union Chief Re-Elected, CnC. TRIB., April
3, 1993, § 2, at 3. "It's a clear call and a mandate for continued real change in the
American auto industry." Bennett was quoted as saying, "Partnership is alive and
well in Spring Hill, Tennessee." Id. A Saturn official was quoted in the same article
as follows:
Saturn leadership will carry on with the business of operating the corporation
in partnership with the members and elected leaders of Local 1853.
The article then continued:
The Saturn-UAW contract is unlike master agreements with the Big Three
automakers. Rather than negotiating new contracts every few years, union
officers and Saturn management periodically make changes to the contract.
Id. The premise is that workers are more productive if they participate in management
decisions.
48. The UAW's associate general counsel, Leonard Page, had these comments
on the return of UAW strikers at Caterpillar:
I understand that some observers see the UAW's suspension of the strike
last April as a surrender or retreat. My answer is, to quote General Oliver
Smith . . . reflecting on [his Marine Divsion's] famous 1950 march from
the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea in back to the eastern seacoast:
"Retreat, Hell! We're just attacking in another direction."
Page, supra note 20, at 16.
* 49. Moberg, supra note 35, at 1. To the same effect, see Bill Casstevens, UAW
vs. Caperpillar-The Battle Continues, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1993, at A15 (Mr.
Casstevens is the Secretary-Treasurer of the UAW, head of its Agricultural Implement
Department and Chief Negotiator for the UAW in the Caterpillar dispute. Casstevens
stated, "[ilnside Caterpillar plants, our "work-to-rule" strategy is denying the
company the extra effort and ingenuity that only a well-motivated workforce can
provide. . .

.")
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management relationships that are essential if we are to remain
competitive."'"
CONCLUSION

There was a time when labor and management in the U.S.
were characteristically at each other's throat. For a number of years
now there has been increasing recognition of the wisdom of old
Benjamin Franklin - that if you don't hang together, you will hang
separately.
Our management is improving but the working people in the
American scene are doing their share too, and unions want to do
their share to help. Unions have come to a recognition that it is very
important that they get increasingly involved in the process of helping
America compete in the world. Workers have to be recognized by
management and they have to have an independent source of strength.
Unions can be vital in organizing a plan to have independent worker
cooperation, so workers get fully involved in cooperating with management in order to have a more efficient productive process.
If a union is totally captive of a company, there will be nobody
sitting there holding management accountable. There has to be somebody in that plant who is not dependent on local management. And
that's not only from the point of view of the workers, that's also
from the point of view of producing an efficient and excellent product
for that company.
In terms of the 90's that is where it is. Job protection for workers
who go on strike is going to be at the very top of the political agenda
for unions, and participation, meaningfully and constructively and
fully, of unions and union members with management to try to make
American industry more competitive and more able is the way of the
future.

51. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 27, at 29.

